The Debate Over the National Bank Act and the Preemption of State Efforts to Regulate Credit Cards*

Mark Furletti**

March 2004

Summary: The National Bank Act (NBA), the 140-year-old statute that led to the creation of nationally chartered banks, has likely been one of the most influential forces in the formation and development of the U.S. credit card industry. The NBA gives nationally chartered banks a wide range of powers and protections. One of these protections, the ability to disregard certain state laws, is currently at the center of a very heated debate. The regulator of national banks, the OCC, recently issued a rule that interprets the act as essentially preempting most state efforts to protect credit card consumers. State attorneys general, consumer advocates, and members of Congress have charged that the OCC’s ruling is overly aggressive and results in bad public policy. This paper examines the current debate over preemption and its regulatory consequences. It analyzes how the expanding scope of preemption has affected the development of the credit card industry and the likely impact of the current debate on the industry’s future.

* Reproduced with the permission of Temple Law Review Volume 77 (c) 2004 Temple University of the Commonwealth System of Higher Education

** Payment Cards Center, The Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Ten Independence Mall, Philadelphia, PA 19106. E-mail: mark.furletti@phil.frb.org. Thanks to Rick Lang, Peter Burns, Bob Hunt, Melissa Jacoby, Elizabeth Schiltz, and Justin Kaufman. The views expressed here are not necessarily those of this Reserve Bank or of the Federal Reserve System.
I. Introduction

Nationally chartered banks underwrite almost three-quarters of the credit card loans made in this country.1 Over the past two decades, these banks have relied on the National Bank Act ("NBA")2 to preempt a variety of state and municipal regulations involving credit card interest rates, fees, and disclosures.3 Recent state and municipal efforts to require national banks to adhere to local predatory lending laws, although directed at home equity and mortgage lending rather than credit card lending, have significantly raised the profile of the preemption debate.4 The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC") (the regulator of national banks) and various state authorities are engaged in a battle over the NBA’s preemption power. This battle involves principles of federalism that are almost 200 years old5 and is of intense interest to state attorneys general, consumer groups, industry executives, and bank regulators.6 The courts, through the interpretation of the NBA, have repeatedly ruled against the states and municipalities when they have attempted to enforce their own consumer protection laws against out-of-state nationally


5 See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819) (holding state tax on Bank of the United States unconstitutional because states lacked power to burden operations of nation’s central bank).

chartered banks. These rulings, coupled with the OCC’s vigorous assertion of preemption, have not stifled state efforts to regulate. Some observers, however, have characterized this most recent fight over state predatory lending laws as “the states’ Alamo.”

This paper will examine the regulatory consequences of the NBA’s near total preemption of state statutes designed to protect credit card consumers. Part II of this paper describes the interpretation of the NBA as it relates to the credit card industry and proposes an analytical framework for thinking about consumer-protection-type preemption. This section also analyzes the legal basis for the NBA’s expanding scope of state law preemption, including relevant case law and regulatory pronouncements. Part III provides an overview of how expanded NBA preemption has affected the development of the credit card industry and consumers’ access to credit. Part IV examines the current debate over preemption and its regulatory consequences for the credit card industry.

The paper concludes that the current debate over preemption will likely have little regulatory effect on the card industry in the near term. Recent interpretations of the NBA make the legal environment at the state level for card issuers much more predictable. States, in effect, have no authority to provide their resident cardholders with consumer protections, as this power is exclusively reserved to the federal government under the OCC’s ruling. To the extent history can be a guide, any future regulation of credit cards by Congress is likely to be targeted and in response to demands for specific consumer protections.

---

7 Id. See also infra note 57 (listing cases in which states have failed at attempts to enforce state laws against nationally chartered banks).
8 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1748.13 (2003) (imposing disclosure requirements on card issuers who have customers in California).
9 States Strike Back, supra note 4, at 9.
10 This paper will not consider the broader issues of federalism raised by the preemption of state laws. For a discussion of such issues, see THE FEDERALIST NOS. 44, 45, 46 (James Madison).
II. The Scope of NBA Preemption With Regard to Credit Card Industry Regulation

A. The National Bank Act’s Power of Preemption

The National Banking Act of 1863 and the National Bank Act of 1864 ("NBA") established a federally chartered banking system. In 1863, just prior to the passage of the NBA, all 1466 of the country’s banks were state-chartered institutions. Congress created the new system to provide for a national and uniform currency and to help stabilize the economy during and after the Civil War.

To oversee the new national system, Congress created a federal agency within the Department of the Treasury called the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC"). The NBA gives the OCC the power to examine, supervise, and regulate all national banks and to protect national banks from what the OCC describes as “potentially hostile state interference.” States, however, are not powerless in relation to nationally chartered banks. Although the NBA establishes a federal banking system independent of state control, in certain instances, it calls for the application of the laws of the state in which a national bank is chartered. For example, even today, a national bank must adhere to the interest rate ceiling established by the legislature of the state in which it is organized (i.e., its home state). National banks may also have to adhere to non-home-state contract, debt collection, taxation, zoning, criminal, and tort laws.

---

11 RAYMOND NATTER, FORMATION AND POWERS OF NATIONAL BANKING ASSOCIATIONS 2.3-2.4 (1983).
12 Id. at 1.2-1.3.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 46,129.
18 See, e.g., Bank of Am. v. City and County of San Francisco, 309 F.3d 551, 559 (9th Cir. 2002) (describing state powers to regulate national banks); Bank Activities, supra note 13 at 46,131 (explaining that these laws apply to extent to which they “incidentally affect” lending activities).
The majority of disputes involving nationally chartered credit card banks\textsuperscript{19} and the NBA concern whether the laws of a state \textit{that is not the bank’s home state} can be applied to the card-issuing bank.\textsuperscript{20} The extent to which these laws are overridden or “preempted” by the NBA is the key legal issue in most of these cases.\textsuperscript{21}

The broad authority granted to the OCC by the NBA, along with the operation of the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution,\textsuperscript{22} is the basis of the OCC’s power to preempt state banking laws.\textsuperscript{23} Preemption occurs when the laws of a particular government (e.g., the federal government) supercede those of another government (e.g., a state or municipal government).\textsuperscript{24} There are essentially three theories of preemption on which the Supreme Court has relied: “express” preemption, “field” preemption, and “conflict” preemption.\textsuperscript{25} The first involves Congress directly stating in the language of an act that it is preempts state law (e.g., this federal law supercedes state law).\textsuperscript{26} The second theory of preemption, commonly referred to as “field” preemption, occurs when, regardless of whether it explicitly or implicitly preempts

\textsuperscript{19} Nationally chartered credit card banks are national banks that issue general purpose credit cards (i.e., Visa, MasterCard, American Express, or Discover credit cards).


\textsuperscript{21} Id.

\textsuperscript{22} U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The clause reads as follows:

\begin{quote}
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{23} Bank Activities, supra note 13, at 46,120.


state law, Congress indicates that it intends federal law to “occupy an entire field of regulation.”27 “Field” preemption requires states to abandon any regulatory activity in that field.28 Finally, federal law can trump a state law under the theory of “conflict preemption.”29 Even if Congress has not preempted an entire field, it can preempt any state law that is in direct conflict with federal law30 or any state law that “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”31

The ways by which the NBA preempts state consumer protection laws are complex and not easily categorized. This paper proposes that there are essentially two distinct strands of preemption: one involving section 85 of the act32 and another involving section 24(Seventh).33 The lines that divide these two strands, however, are not always as clear as the framework may suggest.34 The extent to which these lines are blurred is discussed later in this section. Thinking about the strands as distinct and discrete, however, makes it easier to understand NBA preemption and analyze its consequences.

27 See, e.g., Conference of Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass’ns v. Stein, 604 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that regulatory control of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board over federal savings and loan associations is so pervasive as to leave no room for state regulatory control).
28 Michigan Canners and Freezers Ass’n, Inc., 467 U.S. at 469.
30 See, e.g., Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88 (1992) (finding that state regulation of occupational safety and health issues was preempted because it was in conflict with Occupational Safety and Health Act.
31 Michigan Canners and Freezers Ass’n, Inc., 467 U.S. at 469 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
32 12 U.S.C. § 85 (2004). The NBA addresses interest rate regulation as follows:
Any association may take, receive, reserve, and charge on any loan or discount made, or upon any notes, bills of exchange, or other evidences of debt, interest at the rate allowed by the laws of the State, Territory, or District where the bank is located, or at a rate of 1 per centum in excess of the discount rate on ninety-day commercial paper in effect at the Federal reserve bank in the Federal reserve district where the bank is located, whichever may be the greater, and no more, except that where by the laws of any State a different rate is limited for banks organized under state laws, the rate so limited shall be allowed for associations organized or existing in any such State under title 62 of the Revised Statutes.
33 12 U.S.C. § 24(Seventh) reads as follows:
[A national banking] association shall . . . have power . . . [t]o exercise . . . all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking; by discounting and negotiating promissory notes, drafts, bills of exchange, and other evidences of debt; by receiving deposits; . . . by loaning money on personal security . . .
34 See infra Part II.D discussing complexities of two preemption strands.
The first strand of preemption, based on section 85, involves non-home-state regulation of credit card pricing (such as interest rates, fees, or other price-related items). Typically, substantive state laws are preempted by substantive federal laws. For example, the Fair Credit Reporting Act explicitly preempts state laws that provide consumers with certain protections concerning the privacy of their credit data. In lieu of these state protections, the FCRA gives consumers a host of federal protections. Similarly, federal laws that address environmental problems, such as the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act, preempt existing state statutes and set forth federal environmental standards. Section 85 of the NBA, the section that preempts price-related state regulation, is different. It preempts state lending laws not to make way for federal laws about credit card pricing, but to make way for the laws of states in which card issuers are headquartered. In this way it preempts non-home-state lending statutes with home-state lending statutes.

Recently, the NBA has been read to preempt state laws in a second way. Section 24(Seventh) has been interpreted as preempting all state laws involving non-price-related consumer protection regulation (e.g., disclosure requirements). This second strand of preemption is also unique. It preempts not to make way for a comprehensive federal consumer protection scheme, but to make way, to a large extent, for a loose patchwork of federal regulation.

Overall, the OCC has used the preemption powers read into the NBA to stop various state and municipal efforts to regulate card issuers over the past 25 years. The next two subsections will detail how sections 85 and 24(Seventh) have been interpreted as preempts a host of price-related laws.
and non-price-related consumer protection laws enacted by states to protect credit card consumers.

B. Preemption Under Section 85 of the NBA

Before the Supreme Court interpreted the NBA as preempting non-home-state credit card interest rate laws, card issuer regulation varied by state. Many states imposed ceilings on the interest rates that credit card issuers could charge consumers. Regardless of where a national bank was chartered or located, it typically followed the specific usury laws of the states in which it marketed credit cards. For example, a Maryland-based, nationally chartered card issuer followed Ohio usury laws when offering credit cards to consumers in Ohio and Pennsylvania usury laws when offering credit cards to consumers in Pennsylvania. Effectively, nationally chartered banks with customers throughout the entire country could have had 51 different regulators of interest rates on credit card loans (i.e., 50 state regulators and the OCC).

The Supreme Court’s 1978 decision in *Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis v. First Omaha Service Corporation* clarified the role of state usury laws. In *Marquette*, a national bank chartered in Minnesota (Marquette) sued a competing national bank chartered in Nebraska (First Omaha) for violating a Minnesota usury statute. The Court decided that First Omaha did

---

43 DAVID EVANS & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, PAYING WITH PLASTIC, 71-72 (MIT Press 2000).
44 Id. at 82. See also Robert Johnston, Nation-Spanning Credit Cards, MONTHLY REVIEW (Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco) (March 1972) (describing how state interest rate regulation hurt card bank profits). For a discussion of the history of state usury laws and the ways in which they restricted lending practices, see LENDOL CALDER, FINANCING THE AMERICAN DREAM (1999).
47 Although *Marquette* is credited with changing interest rate exportation practices (i.e., the ability of a bank to charge its home-state interest rate to an out-of-state resident), some courts prior to 1978 held that national banks could choose to charge a credit card customer the higher of the bank’s or customer’s home state usury ceiling rate. See, e.g., Fisher v. First Nat’l Bank of Omaha, 548 F.2d 255 (8th Cir. 1977) (holding that a national credit card bank located in Nebraska could charge a customer living in Iowa highest rate allowed by either state); Fisher v. First Nat’l Bank of Chicago 538 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 1976) (holding that a credit card bank located in Illinois could charge a customer living in Iowa highest rate allowed by either state).
48 439 U.S. at 301.
not have to comply with the Minnesota statute,\textsuperscript{49} clearing the way for nationally chartered credit card issuers to export credit card rates from their own state to any other state in the country.\textsuperscript{50} The Supreme Court’s decision was based on section 85 of the NBA.\textsuperscript{51} Section 85 allows national banks to charge an interest rate as high as that allowed by the usury laws of the state where the bank is “located.”\textsuperscript{52} Marquette asserted that First Omaha was “located” in Minnesota, where its credit cards were used to effect transactions.\textsuperscript{53} The Court found, however, that the location of a national bank can only be the one state that is listed on the bank’s certificate of organization – essentially the state where the bank is headquartered.\textsuperscript{54} To interpret section 85 any other way, the Court reasoned, would render the term “location” meaningless and lead to the destruction of the nation’s complex system of interstate bank lending.\textsuperscript{55} Overall, the \textit{Marquette} ruling found that the NBA effectively preempted the interest rate regulations of the 49 states in which a card issuer could not actually be organized.\textsuperscript{56}

For over a decade after \textit{Marquette}, nationally chartered card issuers faced little section 85 litigation. In the early 1990s, however, consumers challenged a variety of credit card fees as violating the usury statutes of the states in which they lived.\textsuperscript{57} Cardholders asserted that the late, late fees violated the usury statutes of the states in which they lived.\textsuperscript{57} Cardholders asserted that the late, late fees violated the usury statutes of the states in which they lived.\textsuperscript{57}

\textsuperscript{49} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{50} It is interesting that First National Bank of Omaha (First Omaha) ultimately sued Marquette National Bank for lobbying the Minnesota legislature to pass the interest rate ceiling statute at issue in \textit{Marquette}. Agreeing with the Minnesota District Court’s assessment that Marquette’s lobbying did not violate federal law, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed First Omaha’s claim. First Nat’l Bank of Omaha v. Marquette Nat’l Bank of Minn., 636 F.2d 195 (8th Cir. 1980).
\textsuperscript{52} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{53} \textit{Marquette}, 439 U.S. at 310-11.
\textsuperscript{54} \textit{Id.} at 310.
\textsuperscript{55} \textit{Id.} at 312.
\textsuperscript{56} Despite \textit{Marquette}, nationally chartered credit card issuers continue to defend themselves against claims that non-home-state interest ceilings apply. \textit{See}, e.g., Patten v. Maryland Bank, N.A., 2003 WL 21309046 (Tex. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 2003) (striking down claim that nationally chartered bank located in Delaware is bound by Texas interest rate ceiling). For a criticism of \textit{Marquette}’s legal reasoning and public policy implications, \textit{see} Ralph J. Rohner, \textit{Marquette: Bad Law and Worse Policy}, 1 J. RETAIL BANKING 76 (1979).
over limit, return check, and annual fees that their out-of-state card issuers charged were prohibited by the cardholders’ home state usury laws. In response, national banks asserted that these usury statutes were preempted by the NBA. With only one exception, courts sided with the banks.

Section 85 permits a national bank to charge “interest at the rate allowed by the laws of the State” in which the bank is organized. Although Marquette cleared the way for the exportation of the highest interest rate allowed by the laws of an issuer’s home state, it did not specifically address whether home-state-allowed fees (e.g., late, over limit, return check fees) could be exported. The Third Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals, the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota, and the Supreme Courts of Colorado, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey, among others, have ruled on this issue.

(arguing that late fees violated state statute); Spellman v. Meridian Bank (Del.) 1995 WL 764548 (3d Cir. 1996) (arguing late fees violate state usury statute). In 1995, it was estimated that there were at least 32 late fee cases pending in state and federal courts. Denise Gray, A Penalizing Ruling on Penalty Fees, CREDIT CARD MANAGEMENT, Mar. 1, 1995, at 18.


60 While this paper focuses on the NBA and nationally chartered, OCC-supervised credit card banks, courts also preempted state usury laws as they applied to state-chartered, FDIC-insured credit card banks (see supra note 1 for a description of state-chartered banks). Relying on a provision in the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 (DIDMCA) (12 U.S.C. § 3501 (1982)) that is similar to section 85 of the NBA, courts struck down various state usury law challenges. See, e.g., Greenwood Trust Co. v. Mass., 971 F.2d 818 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that state statute prohibiting imposition of late fee by state-chartered, federally insured bank was preempted by DIDMCA); Hill v. Chem. Bank, 799 F. Supp. 948 (D. Minn. 1992) (holding that state statute prohibiting imposition of late and over limit fees by state-chartered, federally insured bank was preempted by DIDMCA); but see Hunter v. Greenwood Trust Co., 668 A.2d 1067 (N.J. 1995) (holding that state statute prohibiting imposition of fees is not preempted by DIDMCA as to state-chartered, federally insured credit card bank). For a description of the DIDMCA and an analysis of the preemption issues it raises, see Elizabeth Schiltz, The Amazing, Elastic, Ever-Expanding Exportation Doctrine and Its Effect on Predatory Lending Regulation, 88 MINN. L. REV. 518, 565-69 (2004).


62 See Spellman v. Meridian Bank (Del.) 1995 WL 764548 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that state statute limiting late and over limit fees charged by out-of-state federally chartered bank was preempted by NBA).

The decision in *Spellman v. Meridian Bank (Delaware)* is generally representative of the reasoning and analysis that many of these courts used to evaluate the meaning of the word “interest” and answer the fee exportation question. *Spellman* involved 11 consolidated actions brought in Pennsylvania courts against nationally chartered banks. One of the questions presented to the three-judge panel was whether the word “interest” as used in section 85 of the NBA included fees. The Third Circuit began its analysis by examining the plain meaning of the statute’s language. It found that the word “interest,” as used in section 85, was ambiguous. The Court then looked to the NBA’s 100-year-old legislative history and its subsequent interpretation by the courts. Although the legislative materials from 1864 (the time of the bill’s passage) were not particularly instructive, the panel found that an interpretation of the NBA by the Supreme Court just 10 years after the act’s passage was insightful. In *Tiffany v. Nat’l Bank of Missouri*, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a national bank in Missouri was limited by the interest rate ceiling imposed on state banks by Missouri or whether it could charge a higher rate made available to other non-Missouri lenders in the state. In finding that national banks could charge the highest rate allowed to any lender in the state, the *Tiffany* court interpreted the NBA as establishing national banks as “national favorites” that should be free from banking regulations.

---

64 See Copeland v. MBNA Am. Bank, 907 P.2d 87 (Co. 1995) (holding that state statute limiting late and over limit fees charged by out-of-state federally chartered bank was preempted by NBA); Richardson v. Citibank (S.D.) N.A., 908 P.2d 532 (Co. 1995) (same).
65 See Bank One, Columbus, N.A. v. Mazaika, 680 A.2d 845 (Pa. 1996) (holding that state statute limiting penalty fees charged by out-of-state federally chartered bank was preempted by NBA).
68 *Id.* at *1.
69 *Id.*
70 See *id.* at *14 (explaining why it found the term ambiguous).
72 85 U.S. 409 (1874).
73 *Id.* at 410-11. Although state legislatures often capped the interest rate that state banks could charge consumers, during the 1980s they allowed other lenders, such as those that financed automobiles and durable consumer goods, to charge higher rates. Essentially, nationally chartered card issuers wanted to be able to charge the higher of the state bank or consumer lender rates. Glenn B. Caner & Charles A. Luckett, *Developments in the Pricing of Credit Card Services*, FEDERAL RESERVE BULLETIN 652 (Sept. 1992).
that could hinder their lending efforts. It also asserted that Congress’ ultimate goal in passing the NBA was to help national banks actually take the place of state banks.

The Third Circuit relied on the “most favored lender” doctrine articulated in Tiffany and the interest rate exportation ruling in Marquette as persuasive evidence that Congress intended national bank lending activities to be especially protected from state intervention. In light of this intent, the Spellman court examined whether “interest” should be interpreted narrowly (i.e., not to cover fees), so as to allow all 50 states to regulate a critical pricing component of credit card loans made to their residents, or broadly, so as to allow national banks to be free from non-home-state fee regulation. It concluded that restricting interest to non-fee finance charges would result in “an unworkable and undesirable hodgepodge” of state regulation that would favor certain state lenders over national bank lenders.

In support of its decision, the Third Circuit cited other courts that had interpreted the word “interest” broadly so as to include commissions, closing costs, and penalty fees. It also relied on the OCC’s interpretation that “interest” includes all fees that offset the costs of risky cardholder behavior (e.g., paying late, charging over your credit limit) or the costs of opening and maintaining an account.

74 Id. at 412-13.
75 The Court asserted: National banks have been National favorites. They were established for the purpose, in part, of providing a currency for the whole country, and in part to create a market for the loans of the General government. It could not have been intended, therefore, to expose them to the hazard of unfriendly legislation by the States, or to ruinous competition with State banks. On the contrary, much has been done to insure their taking the place of State banks.
76 Spellman, 1995 WL 764548 at *16.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id. at *17 (citing, inter alia, Citizens’ Nat’l Bank v. Donnell, 195 U.S. 369, 373-74 (1904) (penalty charges for late payment included). See also Greenwood Trust Co. v. Commonwealth of Mass., 971 F.2d 818, 831 (1st Cir. 1992) (late fees included); Fisher v. First Nat’l Bank of Omaha, supra note 35, at 258-61 (cash advance fees included).
80 Id. (citing letter from Julie L. Williams, Chief Counsel, OCC, to John L. Douglas, Alston & Bird, LLP (Feb. 17, 1995))
Although most courts that heard Spellman-type cases arrived at the same conclusion as
the Third Circuit, the Supreme Court of New Jersey created a conflict with Spellman-type
decisions in Sherman v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A.\textsuperscript{81} Sherman, a resident of New Jersey,
claimed that a late fee charged by Citibank, a national bank organized in South Dakota, violated
New Jersey’s Retail Installment Sales Act of 1960.\textsuperscript{82} The Sherman case, as with Spellman, hinged
on the interpretation of the word “interest” as used in section 85. Relying on a literal reading of
Marquette (finding section 85 applying only to interest rates), a conflict between a 1964 and a
1986 OCC interpretation\textsuperscript{83} of the word “interest,” and the clear language of New Jersey’s
statute,\textsuperscript{84} the Court concluded that interest only includes periodic finance charges and not fees.\textsuperscript{85}

With the law in conflict over the definition of the word “interest,” the Supreme Court in
1996 agreed to review the lower court’s decision in Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A.,\textsuperscript{86} a
section 85 case involving a South Dakota bank, a late fee, and a California usury statute.\textsuperscript{87} Unlike
lower courts, which had to sift through statutory language, legislative history, congressional
purpose, and existing case law, the Supreme Court had the benefit of an official regulation issued
by the OCC just two months before it heard the case.\textsuperscript{88} The OCC’s regulation interpreted

\textsuperscript{81} 668 A.2d 1036 (N.J. 1995).
\textsuperscript{82} Id. at 1040 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:13A-2(g) (West 1995)).
\textsuperscript{83} Compare Letter from James J. Saxon, Comptroller of the Currency (June 25, 1964) with OCC
Interpretive Letter No. 452 from Robert B. Serino, Deputy Chief Counsel, OCC (Aug. 11, 1988).
\textsuperscript{84} N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:13A-2(g) (West 1995).
\textsuperscript{85} Sherman, 668 A.2d at 1042-48.
\textsuperscript{86} 900 P.2d 690 (Cal. 1995), aff’d, 517 U.S. 735 (1996).
\textsuperscript{87} For a detailed explanation of Smiley and its impact on administrative law theory, see Robert W. Guazzo,
Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. – It’s All About Deference to Your Elders: Chevron Difference, 16
\textsuperscript{88} The OCC’s interpretation was put out for comment on March 3, 1995, and adopted on February 9, 1996.
Smiley was argued in front of the Supreme Court on April 24, 1996. The OCC interpretation is as follows:
The term "interest" as used in 12 U.S.C. § 85 includes any payment compensating a
creditor or prospective creditor for an extension of credit, making available of a line of
credit, or any default or breach by a borrower of a condition upon which credit was
extended. It includes, among other things, the following fees connected with credit
extension or availability: numerical periodic rates, late fees, not sufficient funds (NSF)
fees, overlimit fees, annual fees, cash advance fees, and membership fees. It does not
ordinarily include appraisal fees, premiums and commissions attributable to insurance
guaranteeing repayment of any extension of credit, finders’ fees, fees for document
preparation or notarization, or fees incurred to obtain credit reports.
“interest” as used in section 85 to include a wide range of fees that card issuers charged, including late fees, over limit fees, annual fees, and cash advance fees.\textsuperscript{89} Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Scalia analyzed the case using general principles of administrative law. Resolving the fee issue required just two inquiries: first, whether the Comptroller’s interpretation was entitled to deference;\textsuperscript{90} second, if it was, was the Comptroller’s interpretation “arbitrary or capricious”?\textsuperscript{91} Answering the first question in the affirmative, the Court reasoned that the OCC, as the implementing agency of the NBA, was empowered with the discretion to resolve any of the act’s statutory ambiguities.\textsuperscript{92} In addition, it noted that the agency followed the appropriate notice-and-comment procedures in issuing its rule.\textsuperscript{93} The Court then determined that the Comptroller’s interpretation was an acceptable one.\textsuperscript{94} It reviewed dictionary definitions of the word “interest” and compared them with the text of section 85.\textsuperscript{95} In the end, the Court did not find the OCC’s interpretation unreasonable or in direct conflict with the NBA’s language (the threshold established by prior administrative case law).\textsuperscript{96} The Court ultimately upheld the decision of the Supreme Court of California to dismiss Smiley’s usury claim for not stating a cause of action.\textsuperscript{97}

As after the \textit{Marquette} case, card issuers faced little NBA-related litigation in the years immediately following \textit{Smiley}. Both cases seemed to firmly establish that states could not enforce any price-related regulations against out-of-state national banks. The decisions also strengthened OCC interpretations by setting for them a relatively deferential standard of judicial review of not

\textsuperscript{89} Id.
\textsuperscript{91} Id. at 742 (citing \textit{Chevron U.S.A. Inc. 467 U.S. at 844}).
\textsuperscript{92} Id. at 739-41.
\textsuperscript{93} Id. at 741.
\textsuperscript{94} Id. at 744-47.
\textsuperscript{95} Id.
\textsuperscript{96} Id., 517 U.S. at 744-47.
\textsuperscript{97} Id. at 747. Despite \textit{Smiley}, nationally chartered credit card issuers continue to defend themselves, albeit infrequently, against claims that non-home-state fee regulations apply. \textit{See}, \textit{e.g.}, Kent v. Bank of Am., 2003 WL 327465 (Cal. App. 2003) (rejecting assertion that national bank organized in Arizona is subject to fee limitations imposed by California statute when bank lends money to a customer in California).
“arbitrary or capricious.” Despite these developments, it seemed clear that non-home-state banking regulations outside of the scope of section 85 were still permissible.

C. Preemption Under Section 24(Seventh) of the NBA

In 2000, the California legislature passed a law that required credit card issuers to warn consumers about the dangers of making only a minimum credit card payment (generally 2 percent of the balance) each month. This legislation was opposed by the credit card industry and ultimately vetoed by Governor Gray Davis. The following year, Citibank and other card issuers worked with the legislature to craft what legislators termed a “compromise” disclosure bill. Governor Davis signed that bill in September 2001. Shortly after the bill’s passage, a group of large credit card issuers, including Citibank, petitioned a U.S. District Court judge to enjoin the state from implementing the law. The issuers argued that the minimum payment statute, as it applied to nationally chartered banks, was preempted by the NBA. On June 28, 2002, just a few days before certain provisions of the bill were to take effect, the judge granted the issuers a preliminary injunction.

99 Id.
101 The compromise bill that Davis signed required card issuers to place the following warning on the front of consumers’ credit card statements: Minimum Payment Warning: Making only the minimum payment will increase the interest you pay and the time it takes to repay your balance." It also required that issuers either create a customized disclosure regarding the amount of time it would take the cardholder to pay off his or her balance if he or she made only the minimum payment required or provide a generic disclosure (e.g., “A five thousand dollar ($5,000) balance will take 40 years and two months to pay off at a total cost of sixteen thousand three hundred five dollars and thirty-four cents ($16,305.34). This information is based on an annual percentage rate of 17 percent and a minimum payment of 2 percent or ten dollars ($10), whichever is greater.”). It also required that issuers provide consumers with a toll-free phone number that they could use to find out payoff information. The disclosure associated with that provision was as follows: “For an estimate of the time it would take to repay your balance, making only minimum payments, and the total amount of those payments, call this toll-free telephone number: (Insert toll-free telephone number).” CAL. CIV. CODE § 1748.13 (2003).
102 Am. Bankers Ass’n v. Lockyer, 239 F. Supp. 2d 1000 (E.D. Cal. 2002). See also The Battle Over Minimum Payments, supra note 94, at 6 (describing card issuers’ legal maneuvers).
103 Id.
104 Id.
The card issuers, represented by the American Bankers Association, sued Bill Lockyer, the Attorney General of California, challenging the constitutionality of the new law. The issuers claimed that the start-up costs of the program, including printing the disclosures and staffing a special phone unit for the first six months, totaled over $20 million. The issuers also asserted that the warnings were misleading and a provision regarding credit counseling information was not necessarily effective. Above all, the issuers claimed that the statute was preempted by the NBA.

The issuers, however, did not solely rely on section 85 to argue that California’s disclosure law should be preempted. Section 85 of the NBA, as discussed above, generally preempts non-home-state regulation of price-related card features (i.e., those involving “interest”). The statute at issue in Lockyer did not involve interest or fees; it involved disclosures. As such, the issuers primarily asserted their preemption claim under a different section of the NBA: section 24(Seventh). That section, they argued, gives national banks the power to lend money without being “burdened” by costly state regulations, like those imposed by California’s disclosure bill.

Ultimately, the OCC filed an amicus brief in support of the national banks’ position. It explained that the OCC had the authority to assess the burdens that state laws placed on national

---

105 *Am. Bankers Ass’n*, 239 F. Supp. 2d at 1000.
106 *Id.* at 1005.
107 *Id.* at 1006. The credit counseling information was to be provided as follows:

In addition, the cardholder shall be provided with referrals or, in the alternative, with the “800” telephone number of the National Foundation for Credit Counseling through which the cardholder can be referred, to credit counseling services in, or closest to, the cardholder’s county of residence. The credit counseling service shall be in good standing with the National Foundation for Credit Counseling or accredited by the Council on Accreditation for Children and Family Services. The creditor is required to provide, or continue to provide, the information required by this paragraph only if the cardholder has not paid more than the minimum payment for six consecutive months, after July 1, 2002.

banks.\textsuperscript{111} Having reviewed the California law, the OCC determined that the disclosures imposed substantial direct and indirect costs on the issuers’ lending activities.\textsuperscript{112} In addition, the OCC found that the minimum payment warning intruded “massively” on the first page of consumers’ credit card billing statements.\textsuperscript{113} The additional postage, printing, paper, and processing costs, the agency reasoned, infringed on the power of national banks to lend money: a power explicitly provided for in section 24(Seventh) of the NBA.\textsuperscript{114} Citing a number of key federal preemption cases, the OCC explained that any state or local restriction that represents an obstacle to a national bank’s lending power is preempted by operation of the Supremacy Clause.\textsuperscript{115}

The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California agreed with the issuers and the OCC and granted the national banks a permanent injunction.\textsuperscript{116} Central to the case’s outcome was section 24(Seventh) of the NBA and the OCC’s determination that California’s law was overly burdensome. Reviewing a host of NBA cases, the court found that any state law that “impair[s] the efficiency” of national banks is unenforceable.\textsuperscript{117} Efficiency impairing laws, in the court’s view, include any state regulations that increase a national bank’s operating costs or hinder its marketing activities.\textsuperscript{118} Based on the OCC’s estimation that the California disclosure law would impose significant costs on national banks, the court ultimately concluded that the law represented a significant interference with the powers granted national banks by the NBA.\textsuperscript{119} It also noted that state consumer protection laws had not traditionally been enforceable against national banks.\textsuperscript{120}

\textsuperscript{111} Id. at 2.
\textsuperscript{112} Id. at 3.
\textsuperscript{113} Id. at 20.
\textsuperscript{114} Id. at 4-5.
\textsuperscript{115} Amicus Curiae of OCC, supra note 104, at 14-15.
\textsuperscript{116} Lockyer, 239 F. Supp. 2d at 1022.
\textsuperscript{117} Id. at 1012.
\textsuperscript{118} Id. at 1015.
\textsuperscript{119} Id. at 1018.
\textsuperscript{120} Id. at 1016 (citing Bank of Am. v. City and County of San Francisco, 309 F.3d 551, 559 (9th Cir. 2002)).
In an effort to clarify the applicability of state regulation to national banks in light of
*Lockyer* (and to settle legal issues raised by other kinds of state consumer protection statutes), the
OCC issued rules expounding on section 24(Seventh) in January 2004.\(^{121}\) Based on previous court
decisions and theories of express and conflict preemption, the OCC explained that state regulation
of a national bank involving any of the following were impermissible: advertising, non-interest
charges, credit account management, terms of offers of credit, mandatory statements or
disclosures, and, for non-home-states, interest rates and fees.\(^{122}\) The OCC also asserted that the
NBA limits the scope of state regulation to the following areas when they only “incidentally
affect” bank lending: contracts, torts, criminal law, rights to collect debts, acquisition and transfer
of property, taxation, zoning, and any other area of law that the OCC determines to be “incidental
to the…lending operations of national banks.”\(^{123}\)

Although the OCC’s rulemaking has elicited a wide range of responses,\(^{124}\) a plain reading
of the agency’s interpretation indicates that it broadens the OCC’s preemption powers.\(^{125}\) The
agency essentially declared that states have little or no authority to impose any consumer-
protection-oriented regulation on nationally chartered banks and that any such regulation is the
province of federal law.\(^{126}\) This interpretation seems the logical next step in the *Marquette-
Smiley-Lockyer* progression. Although it remains untested, the courts, as seen above, have
historically sided with the OCC’s interpretations.\(^{127}\)

\(^{122}\) *Bank Activities, supra* note 13, at 46,123.
\(^{124}\) Critics have called the proposed rulemaking a “dagger in the heart of federalism.” Jody Shenn et al.,
*States Strike Back*, AMERICAN BANKER, Aug. 28, 2003, at 9. Proponents see it as the OCC “enhancing the
value of the franchise tremendously.” Douglas Cantor, *OCC Preempts in Ga. – and Details Policy*,
\(^{125}\) See, e.g., *San Francisco – Open for Comment*, AMERICAN BANKER, Aug. 14, 2003, at 8 (summarizing
OCC’s proposed rulemaking).
\(^{126}\) See *Bank Activities, supra* note 13, at 46,122-46,123 (explaining limits of state power to regulate
national banks).
\(^{127}\) See *supra* notes 3, 57 and accompanying text for examples of holdings that give great deference to the
OCC and its interpretations.
Overall, *Lockyer* and the OCC’s recent rulemaking create a second legal theory on which card issuers can base a claim that state laws are preempted. The first theory, based on section 85, provides that non-home-state consumer protection regulations that are price-related (i.e., involving “interest”) are preempted by any home-state price regulation. This is the theory on which issuers relied in *Marquette* and *Smiley*. The second theory is based on section 24(Seventh) and card issuers in *Lockyer* relied on it. It provides that when a state consumer protection regulation does not involve a credit card’s price (i.e., “interest”), it is automatically preempted, regardless of whether it emanates from a home- or non-home state. The OCC’s interpretation of the NBA with regard to this latter type of preemption is what triggered the current debate over the NBA. This debate, and its consequences, will be examined later in this paper.

**D. Complexities of Section 85 and 24(Seventh) Preemption**

As explained earlier, the division of NBA preemption into two discrete strands (i.e., section 85 and 24(Seventh)) is somewhat of a simplification. There may not always be a bright line that distinguishes price-related consumer protections from non-price-related protections. For this reason, section 85 and 24(Seventh) claims are not likely mutually exclusive. 128 Consider, for example, if a state were to pass a disclosure statute that applied exclusively to credit card loans with interest rates in excess of 28 percent. A nationally chartered credit card bank could argue that such a statute is preempted by section 85 to the extent it is price related and section 24(Seventh) to the extent it places a burden on the bank’s lending operations. An argument very similar to this one was successfully made in *Lockyer*. 129 Overall, the distinction between section 85 (i.e., price-related) and 24(Seventh) (i.e., non-price-related) preemption may not always be very clear.

---

128 See generally Schiltz, *supra* note 60, at 560-65 (describing expansion of section 85’s scope to include lending terms beyond interest rates and fees).

129 The banks argued that section 1748.13(1) of the California law violated section 85 of the NBA because it exempted from the disclosure statute banks that charged no interest on their loans. *Lockyer*, 239 F. Supp. 2d at 1014.
It is also somewhat of a generalization to assert that, under section 24(Seventh), all non-price-related state regulation, whether emanating from home-states or non-home states, is preempted. While this is the current position of the OCC, existing federal consumer protection legislation alludes to at least a theoretical possibility of allowing states to impose stricter regulation.\textsuperscript{130} For example, the Truth in Lending Act expressly allows states to enact disclosure statutes as long as they are not “inconsistent” with the federal scheme.\textsuperscript{131} Attorney General Lockyer argued unsuccessfually that this provision gave California the right to enforce its disclosure regulations.\textsuperscript{132} Although the District Court in Lockyer did not find this argument persuasive,\textsuperscript{133} it is likely that this argument will be raised in the future. It is also possible that states could indirectly regulate national banks by framing consumer protection issues as within the boundaries of state law. For example, contract law has historically been the domain of states. If a state were to declare certain provisions of the contracts between card issuers and cardholders invalid under state contract law, the state’s action might have immunity from the OCC’s preemptive reach. While these theories remain largely untested, they represent a few ways by which states may circumvent section 24(Seventh)’s broad reach and regulate non-price credit card terms.

\textsuperscript{131} The Truth in Lending Act directly addresses how it affects state laws as follows:
[The provisions of this act involving credit transactions and the advertising of credit] do not annul, alter, or affect the laws of any State relating to the disclosure of information in connection with credit transactions, except to the extent that those laws are inconsistent with the provisions of this title, and then only to the extent of the inconsistency.
\textsuperscript{132} Lockyer, 239 F. Supp. 2d at 1009.
\textsuperscript{133} The Court concluded the following: “the express language of the savings clause indicates that its anti-preemptive effect is limited to TILA. The text provides no indication that the savings clause reaches beyond TILA to control the preemption analysis applicable under any other federal laws, including the federal banking laws.” Id.
III. Card Industry Development as a Result of the Expanding Scope of NBA Preemption

The legal decisions discussed in the previous section significantly altered the economics and competitive landscape of the credit card industry. This section will examine how *Marquette*, *Smiley*, *Lockyer*, and OCC rulemaking affected credit card issuers and cardholding consumers.

Economists and other scholars partially credit the Supreme Court’s decision in *Marquette* with triggering a rapid expansion of our nation’s credit card industry and significant increases in the availability of, and access to, consumer credit. The state of the economy at the time of the ruling, however, likely played an important role in shaping this outcome. Announced in December 1978, the Court decided the *Marquette* case during a time of much economic turmoil. Overall, the mid- to late 1970s were marked by high inflation and increasing interest rates. Card issuers, who had done very well in the early part of that decade, found their spreads (i.e., the difference between the rate they charged cardholders to borrow and the rate issuers had to pay for funds) shrinking. In the majority of states that had adopted usury laws, the interest rates issuers needed to charge to maintain profitability began to exceed the rates allowed by state rate ceilings. The Minnesota statute at issue in *Marquette*, for example, capped credit card loan interest rates at 12.0 percent. According to the Federal Reserve, the federal funds rate, the rate at which banks lend money unsecured to each other overnight, was over 10.0

---


135 *Marquette*, 439 U.S. at 299.


137 EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 43, at 71.

138 Card issuers did well because prevailing interest rates were low. This allowed them to borrow money at a low rate and lend it out at a higher rate.

139 Id.

140 Ellis, supra note 45.

141 *Marquette*, 439 U.S. at 302.
percent in 1978 and reached as high as 19.1 percent in June 1981.142 Considering that banks also incur expenses associated with operations, marketing, and chargeoffs, credit card lending in the late 1970s and early 1980s would not have been feasible in states with low rate ceilings. As a result, issuers stopped marketing cards to consumers in states with interest rate ceilings that were at or below the costs required to fund the loans.143

Immediately after the Supreme Court allowed issuers to export home-state interest rates with its Marquette decision, various state legislatures scrambled to entice nationally chartered credit card issuers to relocate to their states by repealing or amending their usury statutes.144 South Dakota, for example, attracted Citibank’s credit card operations away from New York by raising its state interest rate ceiling to 19.8 percent.145 Similarly, MBNA and three other large, Maryland-based card lenders moved their operations to Delaware after that state repealed its rate ceiling and made creditor-friendly amendments to its consumer lending laws.146 Ultimately, between 1980 and 1985, a total of 15 states did away with their rate ceilings, and many raised rate ceilings to accommodate creditors.147

As states liberalized lending statutes and card issuers took advantage of interest rate exportation, the card industry and, in particular, nationally chartered card issuers, flourished (see Figure 1). The Federal Reserve reported that total U.S. revolving credit grew 172 percent between 1978, the time of the Marquette decision, and 1985.148 The percentage of U.S. families that held

144 See, e.g., EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 44, at 72 (explaining how state legislatures modified usury laws to attract card issuers); Ellis, supra note 45 (same).
145 Glenn B. Canner & Charles A. Luckett, Developments in the Pricing of Credit Card Services, FEDERAL RESERVE BULLETIN (September 1992) at 654.
146 Ellis, supra note 45, at n.15. It is interesting to note that in 1981, national banks located in Delaware had a total of $8,000 in outstanding on-balance-sheet credit card loans, or 0.003 percent of the U.S. total. Five years later, nationally chartered Delaware banks held over $10 billion in on-balance-sheet credit card loans, or 16 percent of the national total. OCC Quarterly Journal, 1Q1982 and 1Q1987.
147 Canner & Luckett, supra note 145, at 654.
148 From December 1978 to December 1985, revolving credit grew from $48.3 billion to $131.6 billion. Federal Reserve Statistical Release G.19 (Consumer Credit) (available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g19/hist/cc_hist_r.txt). Revolving credit includes unsecured
bank-type credit cards (e.g., MasterCard, Visa) increased from 38 percent in 1977 to 55 percent in 1986. From 1983 to 1986, the portion of consumer debt payments that went to credit card issuers increased 50 percent, and the average credit card balance of consumers who carried a balance increased from $969 to $1,472. The expansion of credit during this period particularly affected lower income consumers. The percentage of households earning less than $10,000 who held a credit card increased from 28 percent in 1977 to 42 percent in 1986. Overall, Marquette, and an economic expansion that started in the early 1980s, helped trigger a period of unprecedented credit card purchasing and borrowing.

Despite its age, the Marquette interpretation of the NBA continues to strongly influence the structure and organization of the credit card industry. Consider Delaware, South Dakota, Nevada, Arizona, Rhode Island, and New Hampshire – six states that are home to 4 percent of the country’s population. As of September 2003, the national banks located in these states were owed over $350 billion of the $490 billion in U.S. consumer credit card loans. This concentration of very large credit card banks in only a few states is a direct result of the NBA’s allowing the creditor-friendly laws of these states to be exported throughout the country.

obligations such as credit card loans and consumer installment loans. It excludes mortgages and automobile loans.

149 Glenn B. Canner, Changes in Consumer Holding and Use of Credit Cards, 1970-86, 10 J. RETAIL BANKING 13, 14 (Spring 1988). Canner’s study is largely based on consumer credit surveys conducted by the Federal Reserve Board.

150 Id. at 20.

151 Ellis, supra note 45.

152 Canner, supra note 149, at 14.

153 Id. at 13. Despite significant increases in the use of credit card credit, the costs of credit remained high throughout most of the 1980s. Regardless of their credit risk, consumers paid interest rates in the 18 to 19 percent range. It was not until the early 1990s that issuers began to compete on price and card interest rates fell. See Mark J. Furletti, Credit Card Pricing Developments and Their Disclosure, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Discussion Paper, at 6 (Jan. 2003) (available at http://www.phil.frb.org/pcc/discussion/discussion0103.pdf) (describing credit card pricing in the 1980s and 1990s); The Profitability of Credit Card Operations of Depository Institutions, Report to Congress by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, August 1997 [hereinafter Profitability Report] (available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/creditcard/1997/default.HTM#N_13_) (describing high APRs in 1980s). Instead of arguing that Marquette triggered the expansion of credit, one could argue that the emergence of consumer lending on a national scale triggered Marquette. Both seem plausible.

154 Call Report Data, National Information Center, Sept. 2003 (data on file with author). These loan totals include both on- and off-balance-sheet credit card loans.
Although Smiley’s impact was not nearly as monumental as Marquette’s, the case had the potential to significantly alter the way credit cards were priced.155 Throughout the 1980s, credit card pricing was simple.156 Card issuers charged relatively high interest rates (e.g., 18 percent) and annual fees of around $25.157 The revenues that this pricing scheme generated were more than sufficient to cover most of the expenses associated with an account’s usage.158 In the 1990s, however, competition in the industry became fierce and issuers looked for innovative ways to attract new customers.159 Card issuers cut interest rates, enhanced card features, and eliminated annual fees.160 Annual fee revenues began to decline. Even though outstanding credit card loans grew 44 percent between 1993 and 1996, issuers’ annual fee revenues during that period dropped from $2.0 billion to $1.2 billion.161 In an effort to mitigate the impact of declining annual fee revenues, issuers introduced many new kinds of fees, including late fees, over limit fees, cash advance fees, and bounced-check fees.162 The use of these fees ultimately reversed the downward fee revenue trend and more than made up for lost annual fee revenue.163 The graph in Figure 2, which shows the industry’s fee revenues as a percentage of total revenues from 1990 to 1999, illustrates this trend.

The new fees also eliminated many of the cross-subsidizations that had been inherent in the annual-fee-only product.164 Late fees, for example, made it possible for card issuers to allocate some of the costs associated with collections phone calls and payment reminders to those

---

155 See Paul M. Barrett, Justices Ruling on Credit Cards Favors Banks, WALL ST. J., June 4, 1996, at B1 (reporting that Smiley would have had a tremendous impact on credit card industry had Court found that fees were not included in section 85 definition of interest).
156 Furletti, supra note 153, at 9.
157 Id. at 6.
158 Id. at 10.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Furletti, supra note 153, at 12.
163 Id. After introducing these fees, issuers aggressively raised them. Late and over limit fee amounts increased about 25 percent from 1995 to 1997 and cash advance fees rose 17 percent during the same period. Kevin T. Higgins, Issuers Take a Seat at the Fee Feast, CREDIT CARD MGMT, Sept. 1, 1997, at 34.
164 See, e.g., Valerie Block, Supreme Court Upholds Nationwide Card Charges, AMERICAN BANKER, June 4, 1996, at 1 (explaining how Smiley will allow banks to continue to price efficiently).
cardholders who actually made these costly activities necessary.\footnote{Furletti, \textit{supra} note 153, at 10-11.} Similarly, cash advance fees helped mitigate some of the increased fraud expense associated with such transactions.\footnote{\textit{Id}.} By tying fees to expensive cardholder behavior (and not charging all cardholders a single annual fee), issuers lowered the fee burden of the majority of consumers who pay on time or who do not take out cash advances.\footnote{\textit{Id}.}

Had \textit{Smiley} come out differently and the Supreme Court allowed states to regulate card fees, issuers would have had to abandon many of their emerging (and previous) fee strategies.\footnote{This is the case because of the number of states that were trying to enforce more aggressive limits on credit card terms. Paul M. Barrett, \textit{Consumer’s Ire Could Shift Law on Bank Fees}, \textit{Wall St. J.}, May 15, 1996, at B1 (indicating that about half of states in U.S. were trying to enforce more aggressive limits on credit card terms in 1996).} Instead of charging risky and service-consuming cardholders’ fees, issuers would have been forced to rely on non-fee price components (e.g., interest rates) to fund the expensive behaviors of a minority of their customers.\footnote{See \textit{Profitability Report}, \textit{supra} note 153, at n.13 (explaining development of credit card pricing in light of Marquette)} Such a strategy may have, for example, burdened those who pay on time with the costs of the minority of cardholders who do not. Instead of bringing the use of risk- and service-based fees to a halt, however, \textit{Smiley} affirmed issuer fee practices and relieved issuers of much fee-related litigation.\footnote{The Supreme Court Gives Issuers a Penalty-Fee Victory, \textit{Credit Card News}, July 1, 1996. Despite \textit{Smiley}’s affirmation of the OCC’s interest interpretation, it remains unclear whether other kinds of fees (such as credit card replacement fees, copy fees, currency conversion fees, and access check stop payment fees) are considered “interest” under section 85. It is also unclear whether balance calculation methods, grace periods, and term changes are so much a part of interest as to be beyond the reach of state regulation. Card-issuing national banks have proceeded as if these other fees and terms are exportable. For a discussion of the questions that remain after \textit{Smiley}, see Jeffrey I. Langer, \textit{Banks Gain Right to “Export” Late Fees and Other Loan Fees: The Boundaries of Exportation After Smiley v. Citibank}, 85 \textit{Credit World} (Nov./Dec. 1996).} Although it may be a coincidence, after the \textit{Smiley} decision, card industry fee revenues soared (see Figure 2), growing two to four times faster than credit card receivables.\footnote{\textit{Credit Card Industry Directory}, 1990-1999. The year-over-year growth rates in fee revenue in 1997, 1998, and 1999 are as follows: 16 percent, 21 percent, and 9 percent. The corresponding year-over-year growth rates in credit card receivables were 11 percent, 4 percent, and 5 percent.} By preventing non-home states from regulating fees, \textit{Smiley} ultimately
allowed issuers to continue to eliminate cross-subsidizations and reduce the costs of most consumers’ credit card credit.172

*Lockyer* is a less significant decision than was *Marquette* or *Smiley*. First, *Marquette* and *Smiley* were decided by the Supreme Court and as such represent the law of the land until Congress or the Supreme Court itself declares otherwise.173 *Lockyer*, in contrast, was decided by the District Court for the Eastern District of California – a court whose holdings have limited effect outside of the 34 counties in its district.174 Second, Attorney General Lockyer has decided not to appeal the District Court’s decision in the case.175 Given this, the decision will not be subject to any further judicial review.

Despite these considerations, *Lockyer* is important because it represented one of the first major cases in which section 24(Seventh) was successfully used to preempt a state effort to enforce a non-price-related consumer protection.176 The *Lockyer* decision, and the OCC’s subsequent rulemaking, made clear that states, regardless of whether they are home or non-home states, have little or no authority to enforce substantive disclosure statutes against national

---

172 Economists and scholars have conducted extensive research into the effects of usury laws (including rate ceilings and other price controls) on the availability and cost of credit. Much of this research was prompted by Congress’ consideration of several bills in 1986 that would have imposed a nationwide credit card rate ceiling. Almost uniformly, these economists found that such price controls would seriously affect consumer access to credit. In support of their conclusions, some of these researchers relied on pre-*Marquette* data from states that had strict usury statutes. See, e.g., Glenn B. Canner & James T. Fergus, *The Effects on Consumers and Creditors of Proposed Ceilings on Credit Card Interest Rates*, Federal Reserve Board of Governors Staff Study No. 154 (October 1987) (describing negative effects of usury statutes); Daniel J. Villegas, *The Impact of Usury Ceilings on Consumer Credit*, 56 S. Econ. J. 126 (July 1989) (explaining how usury statutes reduce access to credit and increase overall cost of credit); Christopher C. DeMuth, *The Case Against Credit Card Interest Rate Regulation*, 3 Yale J. on Reg. 201 (1986) (discussing harmful effects of usury controls); William F. Baxter, *Section 85 of the National Bank Act and Consumer Welfare*, 1995 Utah L. Rev. 1009 (asserting that federal preemption of state usury statutes improves consumer and total welfare). But see Vincent D. Rougeau, *Rediscovering Usury: An Argument for Legal Controls on Credit Card Interest Rates*, 67 U. Colorado L. Rev. 1 (1996) (challenging generally accepted economic principles regarding harmful effects of usury laws). Researchers also found, however, that increased access to credit may harm consumer welfare. See, e.g., Jonathan Zinman, *The Impact of Liquidity on Household Balance Sheets: Micro Responses to a Credit Card Supply Shock*, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Working Paper (2003) (reviewing economic literature on the consequences of increased access to credit and describing negative effects researchers observed).

173 See *supra* notes 46-56 and 86-97 and accompanying text describing these two decisions.

174 See *supra* notes 108-15 and accompanying text describing background of *Lockyer*.


176 See *supra* Part II.C for a description of section 24(Seventh) preemption as applied in *Lockyer*. 

25
banks.177 The case also reaffirmed the courts’ duty to defer to the OCC’s opinion when determining the extent to which a local law interferes with a national bank’s powers.178 In part, the district court’s decision in Lockyer triggered the OCC’s finding of broad preemption powers in section 24(Seventh).179 This finding essentially immunizes credit card issuers from state consumer protection regulation.180

Lockyer and the latest OCC ruling also make clear that issuing non-price-related consumer regulations is now the province of the federal government. For lenders and consumers, this has important implications. Now the distinction between price and non-price protections will be even more important for lenders and consumers. Price-related terms will be generally governed by home-state regulations while non-price terms will be governed by federal regulations (to the extent to which either exist).

IV. How the Current Debate Over Preemption Will Likely Shape the Future of Card Industry Regulation

The OCC’s issuance of preemption rules has generated much media attention and debate. The American Banker, a trade publication of the banking industry, published over 30 articles on preemption during the three months ending in February 2004.181 The articles included editorial pieces from industry leaders supporting the OCC’s decision and state banking commissioners deriding it.182 Senior OCC officials have argued their case for broader preemption power in front

177 But see supra Part II.D for a discussion of the complexities of section 85 and 24(Seventh) preemption principles.
178 See supra notes 116-119 and accompanying text describing court’s deference to OCC’s interpretation.
179 See supra Part II.C describing Lockyer decision and subsequent OCC rulemaking on preemption.
180 But see supra Part II.D for a discussion of tactics states may use to circumvent federal preemption.
181 List of articles on file with author.
182 William M. Isaac (former FDIC Chairman), Preemption Challenge is a Futile Exercise, AMERICAN BANKER (Feb. 24, 2004) at 2A.
of Congress and during all but one of their public speaking engagements from September 2003 to February 2004.\(^\text{183}\)

Those opposing the OCC’s preemption rules, however, have also been quite vocal. For example, Elliot Spitzer, New York’s Attorney General, claims that the OCC’s latest regulations strip consumers of important protections and are “opposed by all 50 states, Democrats and Republicans.”\(^\text{184}\) On January 15, 2004, Spitzer filed suit against a national bank in an effort to challenge the OCC’s ruling.\(^\text{185}\) Consumer advocacy groups are also intensely interested in the issue. The U.S. Public Interest Research Group (USPIRG), for example, launched a web site devoted to educating consumers about what it perceives to be the OCC’s “abusive preemption policies.”\(^\text{186}\) Congress has also taken notice of the issue. The House Financial Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations held a hearing on the OCC’s rulemaking on January 28, 2004, at which one representative charged that the preemption rule “demonstrates a lack of respect for Congress and [the Oversight] committee.”\(^\text{187}\) How will this rather contentious debate over the preemptive powers of the NBA likely be resolved? What are the likely consequences of this debate for card issuers and card-holding consumers? This section will examine the debate over preemption in more detail and its potential regulatory consequences.

\section{A. The Current Debate}

The current debate over preemption is complex and multifaceted. In part, the debate is about territory. State legislators and attorneys general argue that the OCC’s rule denies states the power to issue non-price-related consumer protections, a power states thought they had prior to

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}[\text{183}]
\item Six of the seven public speeches made by senior OCC officials between September 2003 and February 2004 addressed the preemption issues raised by the agency’s rulemaking. A list of OCC speeches can be found on the agency’s web site at http://www.occ.treas.gov/speeches.htm.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Lockyer and the OCC’s preemption ruling. They advocate a state-by-state regulatory approach in which state officials can enact and enforce legislation that protects the unique interests of their citizens. They claim that such a system benefits everyone by allowing states to serve as “laboratories” for regulatory “best practices.” The OCC’s latest preemption ruling, they argue, disallows state-based experimentation and leaves consumer protection initiatives to the sole discretion of Congress. Overall, the effect of state law preemption is to take away from states the consumer protection powers they once thought they had.

Another significant part of the debate concerns substantive consumer protections. Over the past few years, the NBA has been interpreted as preempting substantive state consumer protection laws involving ATM usage fees, credit card balance payoff disclosures, and “predatory lending.” Although the NBA’s preemption of municipal ATM laws and California’s disclosure law generated controversy, it is the last of these three issues that triggered intense debate and recent congressional interest. Predatory lending involves a wide range of disreputable

---

188 See, e.g., Dudley Gilbert, OCC’s Preemption Rule Is About Keeping Market Share, AMERICAN BANKER (Feb. 20, 2004) at 11 (arguing that national banks have been complying with state laws for over 140 years before OCC “clarified” the NBA with its interpretation).


190 Id.

191 Id.

192 Another preemption issue that states are raising involves their right to investigate unfair or deceptive acts and practices (UDAP) claims against national banks under state UDAP laws. The OCC asserts that it has the authority to investigate such claims under section 5 of the FTC Act and that this power preempts states’ UDAP powers. Recently, the House Committee on Financial Services voted to, in essence, chastise the OCC for preempts investigatory powers because, in the Committee’s view, the OCC lacks the resources to pursue such claims. This paper and its conclusion do not address UDAP issues, which usually involve accusations of bad bank behavior in the past (i.e., the bank is accused of doing something “deceptive” that may not violate a specific provision of federal or state law). The focus of this paper is on state statutes that prospectively set particular consumer protection standards for state residents (i.e., California’s disclosure statute).

193 See, e.g., Bank of Am. v. City & County of San Francisco, 309 F.3d 551 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S.Ct. 2220 (2003) (holding NBA preempts San Francisco ATM fee caps).


home lending practices, including equity stripping, loan flipping, and credit insurance packing.\textsuperscript{196} Predatory lending became the centerpiece of the preemption debate after Georgia attempted to enforce provisions of its anti-predatory lending statute against a national bank.\textsuperscript{197} In response, the OCC issued a determination and order declaring that the Georgia statute, to the extent that it applies to national banks, is unenforceable.\textsuperscript{198} Unlike the ATM fee and credit card disclosure issues, which generated moderate public interest, the predatory lending issue drove preemption to the front page of newspapers and to the top of the agendas of attorneys general.\textsuperscript{199}

To a large extent, consumer groups have not joined the preemption debate because of the territorial issues but rather because of the substantive issues. These groups do not actually want 50 different state laws that protect consumers in various lending situations to varying degrees.\textsuperscript{200} They would prefer a federal standard that benefits all consumers.\textsuperscript{201} Gail Hillebrand, an attorney with the Consumers Union who is lobbying against the OCC’s preemption rule, contends that state laws provide Congress with the necessary impetus to act.\textsuperscript{202} She sees the OCC’s preemption rules as potentially disengaging state lawmakers and, in turn, removing the states’ ability to pressure Congress for substantive federal reforms.\textsuperscript{203}

Given that the OCC’s preemption ruling raises both territorial and substantive issues, opponents of the ruling are seeking two distinct remedies from Congress. The first is an overruling of the OCC’s position that states have no authority to enforce their own consumer protection statutes. The second is the enactment of a federal anti-predatory lending statute. While it is difficult to say exactly how the debate will resolve itself in the near term, it is possible, given

\textsuperscript{196} See FTC web site at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/alerts/eqtyalrt.htm (describing how consumers can avoid home equity scams).
\textsuperscript{197} Georgia Fair Lending Act, GA CODE ANN. § 7-6A-1.
\textsuperscript{198} Preemption Determination Order, supra note 195 at 46,264-65.
\textsuperscript{199} See supra notes 174-180 and accompanying text describing current public debate.
\textsuperscript{200} In a recent interview, Gail Hillebrand, a Consumers Union attorney, explained, “If you look at how consumer-protection law has developed from a state to a federal level, you don’t get 50 state laws…Generally, you get one or two state laws, and then Congress acts.” Todd Davenport, An Issue’s Moment of Truth? A Complex History, and an Uncertain Future, AMERICAN BANKER (Jan. 28, 2004) at 10.
\textsuperscript{201} Id.
\textsuperscript{202} Id.
\textsuperscript{203} Id.
the history of preemption and its effects on the card industry’s development, to make some observations about the likely long-term effects of this complex debate on card industry regulation.

B. Likely Regulatory Consequences for Card Market Participants

For credit card issuers and consumers, the OCC’s latest preemption ruling creates a regulatory environment that is more predictable in some ways and less predictable in others. Unless the courts or Congress overrule the OCC’s interpretation, for example, card issuers and consumers can be rather confident that the only non-price consumer protection regulations that must be followed are those issued by the federal government. At the same time, the current debate increases the chances that Congress will consider enacting an anti-predatory lending statute. For card market participants, such a statute will not have direct effects, since its primary focus would be home equity and mortgage lending. But it could have indirect effects and unintended consequences for credit card lending. The remaining part of this section considers the future of state and federal consumer protection laws that apply to credit cards.

1. State Consumer Protection Laws

Given the holdings in Marquette and Smiley, the only states that can enact and enforce laws regarding credit card pricing (i.e., interest rates and fees) are those in which card issuers are chartered. As explained in the previous section, six states with just 4 percent of the population are home to the banks that issue almost three-quarters of U.S. credit card loans. Most of these states modified their lending laws in the early 1980s to attract card issuers from less lender-friendly states. Since that time, these states have benefited from the jobs and tax revenues

---

204 See supra note 171 and accompanying text describing power of states to regulate after the OCC’s preemption rulemaking.
205 Such legislation has already been proposed. On November 23, 2003, Senator Paul Sarbanes introduced the Predatory Lending Consumer Protection Act of 2003 (S. 1928). The goal of the legislation is to protect consumers from predatory lending practices associated with high-cost mortgage transactions. Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia BANKING LEGISLATION & POLICY, December 2003, Vol. 22, No. 4
206 See supra notes 56, 77-78 and accompany text for discussion of these holdings’ effect on the industry.
207 See supra note 154 and accompanying text for these statistics.
208 See supra notes 144-47 and accompanying text describing the modification of state usury laws.
associated with the growth of the card industry. Given these states’ incentives, it seems unlikely they will enact any price-related consumer protection statutes. Overall, consumers and issuers can probably expect to see little in the way of price-related state regulation as long as section 85 of the NBA remains unchanged.

While section 85 allows for home-state regulation of price terms, the latest interpretation of section 24(Seventh) precludes any state regulation of non-price card terms. Prior to this interpretation, however, states were not very active in providing credit card consumers with non-price consumer protections. Besides the disclosure law at issue in Lockyer, the most significant non-price consumer protection law that applied to card issuers was California’s Areias-Robbins Credit Card Account Full Disclosure Act of 1986. The solicitation disclosure mandated by that act is thought to be the basis for the “Schumer Box,” a federal credit card disclosure scheme adopted by Congress two years later. Going forward, however, states will be prohibited by the OCC’s interpretation of section 24(Seventh) from enacting any kind of credit card disclosure statutes. The unlikely possibility of Congress’ giving states the power to regulate non-price credit card terms is addressed in the next section.

2. Federal Consumer Protection Laws

Although national banks have organized themselves to avoid most state-level price regulation, they are not immune from federal price regulation. Were Congress to consider regulating card issuers’ prices, it would not be the first time. In 1991, when interest rates began to fall and credit card rates did not, President Bush and Congress threatened the card industry with

---

209 For example, Delaware’s banking sector employs over 38,000 of the state’s 500,000 working-aged adults. These banking sector employees earned, on average, almost $48,000 per year and generated over 12 percent of the state’s personal income tax receipts. In addition, Delaware banks paid the state $142 million in bank franchise taxes in 2003. Maureen Milford, Bank Mergers Has Pros, Cons For Del., THE NEWS JOURNAL, Jan. 25, 2004.

210 See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text for discussion of section 24(Seventh)’s interpretation.

211 See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text for discussion of section 24(Seventh)’s interpretation.

212 See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text for discussion of section 24(Seventh)’s interpretation.
price controls.213 Such controls would have tied credit card interest rates to an index rate plus some margin (e.g., 800 basis points over the six-month Treasury bill rate).214 Although the price caps were never adopted, subsequent research suggests that the threat of regulation precipitated the lowering of credit card annual percentage rates (APRs) for most consumers.215 The prospects of federal price controls prompted a host of other research, most of which concluded that price caps would restrict consumers’ access to credit.216 This research, Congress’ ultimate decision to abandon price regulation, and a broader trend away from federal price controls seem to support the conclusion that card market participants are not likely to see much from the federal government in the way of federal usury laws.

The future of non-price federal consumer protections, however, is more complicated. For now, unless the Supreme Court changes its position on the deference it provides OCC determinations and overrules the agency’s interpretation of section 24(Seventh), non-price consumer protection regulation remains the exclusive province of Congress.217 Given this, those that oppose the OCC’s preemption rule have already begun concentrating their lobbying efforts at the federal level.218 These groups are calling upon federal legislators to, among other things, allow states to legislate in this area and to provide consumers with predatory lending protections.219 Based on recent developments in the regulation of financial services,220 if Congress

---

214 Id.
215 Id.
216 See note 172 supra and accompanying text for a description of the impact of price controls on credit card interest rates.
217 See Part III.C supra for a description of Congress’ powers given OCC’s interpretation of section 24(Seventh).
219 See, e.g., id. (advocating that “best system for consumers” is one in which federal and state regulators work together).
220 See, e.g., Mark G. Guzman, Slow But Steady Progress Toward Financial Deregulation, SOUTHWEST ECONOMY 1 (Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas) (Jan. 2003) (available at
acts at all, consumer advocates are likely to have more success with the latter than with the former.

The trend in card industry regulation is a movement toward more federal standards. Prior to Marquette, the vast majority of protections on which cardholding consumers could rely were state-based.221 Today, much of the consumer-issuer relationship is directly or indirectly governed by federal law.222 For example, before a potential cardholder can be solicited by phone, a card issuer, or its agent, must ensure that such a call is permissible under the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act (1994).223 Once the issuer has the consumer on the phone, or if the issuer contacts the consumer via mail, the offer of credit must include specific disclosures under the Truth in Lending Act (amended in 1988).224 In evaluating a consumer’s credit information for the purpose of determining whether he or she should receive a credit card, the issuer must comply with the Fair Credit Reporting Act (amended in 2003).225 After the consumer is approved for the card, the issuer will likely be able to enforce contractual provisions that require that all disputes be resolved in arbitration, a result of recent interpretations of the Federal Arbitration Act (1925).226 If the issuer wants to share data it has collected on the cardholder in order to offer him or her another product, it must comply with the privacy provisions of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (1999).227 Finally, if a cardholder fails to make payments on an account and it is placed with a collection agency, the agency must comply with


221 See Schiltz, supra note 60, at 526-33 (describing state laws that governed consumer credit transactions prior to federal involvement).

222 See infra notes 223-28 and accompanying text for examples of federal consumer protections.


225 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1681(m) (2004) (requiring that users of credit reports notify consumers when credit report information is used to deny them credit).

226 See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1925) (enabling lenders to compel arbitration if consumer and lender have agreed to arbitrate disputes).

the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (amended 1996).\textsuperscript{228} Overall, it is clear that, over the past 15 years, federal laws have come to comprise a significant portion of all regulation imposed on credit card issuers.

Given Congress’ proclivity for adopting standards for cardholder protections and a broader trend toward federal deregulation of the financial industry, it does not seem likely that Congress will pass legislation that authorizes states to force national banks to comply with state-level consumer protections. It is more likely, to the extent to which history can be a guide, that Congress will respond to particular consumer protection concerns with some kind of targeted federal protection.

As mentioned earlier, the concern at the heart of the current debate over preemption is predatory lending.\textsuperscript{229} As such, support for an anti-predatory lending statute is gathering momentum in Congress.\textsuperscript{230} While on its face such legislation seems to not involve the credit card operations of national banks, card market participants should continue to monitor the current debate. As with any statute, a predatory lending bill could end up affecting card issuers and cardholders to the extent to which a last minute amendment or rider pertaining to unsecured lenders is added. In addition, the bill could burden card issuers or cardholders in some unanticipated manner. Overall, barring unforeseen amendments or consequences, card market participants will likely not see much in the way of card-specific regulation come out of the current debate.

Unless Congress significantly alters the NBA or overrules the OCC, card issuers will likely benefit from a more predictable legal environment at the state level. Immunity from state-


\textsuperscript{229} See supra notes 193-99 and accompanying text for discussion of centrality of predatory lending in current debate.

by-state regulation, however, may put more pressure on Congress to consider federal legislation. To the extent Congress now views consumer credit regulation as its full responsibility and views consumers as deprived of any state regulatory alternatives, it may become more interested in exercising its regulatory powers. At present, however, much of the debate about the need for consumer protection legislation has tended to focus on issues in which the credit card industry is not directly involved, such as predatory lending in the home equity and mortgage markets.231 For card market participants, such a statute will not have direct effects, but unless narrowly targeted, it may have indirect effects and unintended consequences for the card industry.

V. Conclusion

It is highly unlikely that those responsible for the passage of the National Bank Act of 1864 could have anticipated how it would ultimately influence our nation’s $550 billion credit card lending industry. Overall, the reach of this Civil-War-era of legislation is profound. Evidence of this includes the industry’s highly concentrated organization, product pricing methods, and immunity from state consumer protection regulation.

Today, after Lockyer and the OCC’s preemption ruling, the NBA essentially grants the home states of nationally chartered banks the power to regulate price-related consumer protections and gives the federal government the exclusive power to regulate non-price-related consumer protections. This interpretation has states lobbying for Congress to overrule the OCC and has consumer advocates demanding expanded substantive federal consumer credit protections. Based on the federal government’s past role in the development of the card industry and current regulatory trends, it is likely that the recent debate about consumer protection – which has tended to focus on predatory practices in home equity and mortgage lending – will have little direct impact on card issuers in the near term. Nevertheless, the passage of any type of federal

231 See supra notes 196-99 and accompanying text describing current debate.
legislation regarding consumer protection can always have unintended and indirect consequences for the credit card industry. So while the OCC’s ruling may have immunized the card industry from state-by-state consumer protection regulation, the industry still has a stake in the current debate about the need for additional consumer protection regulation.
Figure 1

Credit Card Loans by Bank Charter Type
1968-2002

On-Balance-Sheet Card Loans (Billions)

Source: Call Report Data (on file with author)
Fee Income as a Percentage of Total Revenue*
1990-1999

* Fee income does not include fees from securitization. Ratio is calculated by dividing credit card fee income for industry by the sum of the credit card interest income for the industry and the total credit card fee income for industry as reported by CardWeb.

Source: October 1999 and July 2000 issues of CardTrack, CardWeb.com