Saturday, May 18, 2013
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The program in Consumer Credit and Payments is a Bank-wide effort to advance our understanding of these markets and to make this information available to industry, consumers, policymakers, researchers, and the public at large. On these pages you will find research and analysis produced by the Bank's subject matter experts in Community Development Studies and Education, the Payment Cards Center, Research, Supervision and Regulation, and other areas.
The center is seeking qualified individuals to join its team. Currently, there are several openings for professionals in the consumer credit and payments industry and an opening for a research assistant.
The Payment Cards Center and the Research Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia are co-organizing their seventh biennial conference focusing on new research in consumer credit and payments. Paper submissions will be accepted through June 30, 2013.
An Overview of the Nonprofit Foreclosure Counseling Industry in PhiladelphiaThis paper provides an overview of the nonprofit foreclosure counseling industry in Philadelphia, including a survey of the city's counseling agencies that highlights the challenges the industry faces. Specifically, the paper discusses the industry's structure, financial status, and requirements for funding.
The statistics are divided into two sections: (1) Consumer Credit Snapshot, which contains data on consumer debt, credit performance, and supply and demand of credit, and (2) Consumer Payments Snapshot, which includes statistics on credit and debit cards and other noncash payments as well as families' revolving credit.
In this study, the authors make use of a massive database of mortgage defaults to estimate REO liquidation timelines and time-related costs resulting from the recent post-crisis interventions in the mortgage market and the freezing of foreclosures due to "robo-signing" revelations. The cost of delay, estimated by comparing today's time-related costs to those before the start of the financial crisis, is eight percentage points, with enormous variation among states. While costs are estimated to be four percentage points higher in statutory foreclosure states, they are estimated to be 13 percentage points higher in judicial foreclosure states and 19 percentage points higher in the highest-cost state, New York. They discuss the policy implications of these extraordinary increases in time-related costs, including recent actions by the GSEs to raise their guarantee fees 15-30 basis points in five high-cost judicial states. Combined with evidence that foreclosure delays do not improve outcomes for borrowers and that increased delays can have large negative externalities in neighborhoods, the weight of the evidence is that current foreclosure practices merit the urgent attention of policymakers.
In the data, most consumer defaults on unsecured credit are informal and the lending industry devotes significant resources to debt collection. The authors develop a new theory of credit card lending that takes these two features into account. The two key elements of their model are moral hazard and costly state verification that relies on the use of information technology. They show that the model gives rise to a novel channel through which IT progress can affect outcomes in the credit markets, and argue that this channel can be critical to understand the trends associated with the rapid expansion of credit card borrowing in the 1980s and over the 1990s. Independently, the mechanism of the model helps reconcile high levels of defaults and indebtedness observed in the US data.
Refinancing a first mortgage puts legal principles in conflict when other, junior, liens also exist. On one hand, the principle that seniority follows time priority leaves the new refinancing mortgage junior to mortgages that were junior to the original, refinanced first mortgage. On the other hand, the principle of equitable subrogation gives the refinancing mortgage the seniority of the claim it paid down. States resolve this tension differently, thus differentiating how much a second mortgage impedes refinancing of the first. The authors exploit this cross-state variation to identify the impact on mortgage refinancing and find that refinancing is significantly more likely in the states following the principle of equitable subrogation when the homeowner also has a second mortgage.
Refinancing a first mortgage puts legal principles in conflict when other, junior, liens also exist. On one hand, the principle that seniority follows time priority leaves the new refinancing mortgage junior to mortgages that were junior to the original, refinanced first mortgage. On the other hand, the principle of equitable subrogation gives the refinancing mortgage the seniority of the claim it paid down. States resolve this tension differently, thus differentiating how much a second mortgage impedes refinancing of the first. The authors exploit this cross-state variation to identify the impact on mortgage refinancing and find that refinancing is significantly more likely in the states following the principle of equitable subrogation when the homeowner also has a second mortgage.